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decision are so numerous and varied as to be impossible to calculate and reduce
to any general rule.
The discussion in this comment has not considered the manner in which no-
clear-majority decisions should be cited. At best, it would appear that they
should be used as precedent only after a careful analysis and evaluation which
recognizes the absence of clear-majority agreement. This is sometimes done,
but more often apparently disregarded. The difficulties inherent in the former
inquiry and the dangers incident to the latter practice raise the further question
of the propriety of handing down no-clear-majority decisions at all: Alterna-
tively, it may be suggested that much can be done by the Court to indicate the
points of agreement and disagreement in such cases. It is hoped that it will no
longer be necessary to label them no-clear-majority decisions, but rather clear,
no-majority decisions.
TAXATION OF MULTIPLE TRUSTS
The five-year throwback provision of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code has
re-focused attention on an old problem'--use of a number of accumulating
trusts which, as a result of the progressive rate structure, are each taxed at a
lower rate than would be applicable if only a single trust were used.2 Although
avoidance of the additional surtax in this manner' was possible long before the
1954 Code, prior to 19544 it was possible to use a single accumulating trust, give
I Interest in the multiple trust problem reached a peak in the late 1930's as a result of a
Congressional investigation. Consult Hearings before the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion
and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). For discussion of the complexion of the problem
at that time, consult Multiple Trusts and the Minimization of Federal Taxes, 40 Col. L. Rev.
309 (1940), and Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 41,
71-75 (1937).
2 Although statistical evidence of the use of multiple trusts is understandably unavailable,
the attention the device has received suggests that it is highly popular among tax-planners.
For example, the Wall Street Journal began a recent feature article on the effect of taxation
on business and property planning with the following: "Sylvanus G. Felix is building a $3.5
million, 17-story office building in Oklahoma City. He's not alone in this venture. Far from it.
His co-entrepreneurs: 27 trusts (for the benefit of his children) and eight corporations (he's
president of each one). Mr. Felix could eliminate a lot of bookkeeping by handling the project
alone. But he'd rather not. By splitting the building's income among 36 taxpayers, he figures
he'll cut total income taxes 'by more than 50%.' "The Wall Street Journal, p. 1, col. 6 (Mid-
west ed., Jan. 5, 1956).
3 A single taxpayer with no dependents receiving $100,000 per year from personal services
and $100,000 ordinary income from investments pays approximately $156,000 in taxes at
present rates. If all the investment property were transferred and taxed to a single trust, the
saving would be approximately $22,000 per year. Use of ten trusts would save an additional
$41,000 per year. The saving exists not only because the marginal tax rate is lower, but also
because each trust receives a deduction for personal exemption. Int. Rev. Code §642(b),
26 U.S.CA. §642(b) (1954).
4 Consult Aronsohn and Michaelson, Partnerships Estates and Trusts (Practicing Law
Institute Fundamentals of Federal Taxation Series) 48-54 (1953 ed.), for an explanation of the
65-day and 12-month rules of Int. Rev. Code §162, 26 U.S.C.A. §162 (1939) as amended.
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the beneficiaries regular annual income distributions, and nevertheless retain
a substantial part of the tax burden in the trust.5 The throwback rule, by forc-
ing accumulations of trust income for long periods,6 deprives beneficiaries of
regular income distributions unless a series of trusts, distributing in succession,
is used.
The multiple trust problem has three aspects. First, the "accumulating
trust" aspect: Because a single accumulating trust may be taxed as a separate
entity, the grantor may use it to secure a substantial tax saving and yet the
beneficiaries eventually will receive the income. Second, the "multiplication of
entities" aspect: By using several accumulating trusts, the saving may be fur-
ther increased as each trust will be taxed at a rate lower than the rate that would
have been applicable to a single trust, though again the beneficiaries eventually
will receive the income. Third, the "throwback avoidance" aspect: By arrang-
ing distributions from the several entities to come within the throwback rule
exceptions,7 the beneficiaries may receive the equivalent of current income while
the tax saving remains unimpaired.
The multiple trust problem may thus be approached on three levels. First,
tax savings through use of a single accumulating trust might be eliminated by
abolishing the trust as a taxpaying entity. Although this change might be desir-
able from the viewpoint of general tax policy, it will not be examined in this
comment, for the consequences of the change are too drastic to justify its adop-
tion solely to combat multiple trusts. The "throwback avoidance" aspect might
be met by eliminating some or all of the throwback-rule exceptions.8 If all
exceptions were eliminated so that every distribution of income or its equiva-
lent would be taxable to the beneficiary whenever made, the single accumulat-
5 "[I]f the income of 1950 was distributed on March 8, 1951, and the income of 1951 was
distributed on March 3, 1952, then nothing was taxable to the beneficiary on account of 1950
income and only the 1951 income was taxable to the beneficiary. Hence by alternating the
annual distributions on March 8 and March 3 of successive years the tax burden on half the
trust income could still be shifted from the beneficiary to the trustee. Since the interval be-
tween distributions was still in effect a yearly one, the beneficiary remained on a regular annual
schedule and did not suffer any inconvenience." Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation
754 (1955 ed.).
6 The general operation of the throwback rule is outlined by proposed Treas. Reg. §1.665-1
(1956):" An accumulation distribution is 'thrown back' to each of the five preceding years in
inverse order. That is, it will be taxed to the beneficiaries of the trust in the year the distri-
bution is made or required, but in general only to the extent of the distributable net income of
those years which was not in fact distributed. However, the resulting tax will not be greater
than the aggregate of the taxes that would have been attributable to the amounts thrown
back to previous years had they been included in gross income of the beneficiaries in those
years. To prevent double taxation, the beneficiaries receive a credit for any taxes previously
paid by the trust which are attributable to the excess thrown back."
7 Consult discussion at 160-61 infra.
3 Ibid.
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ing trust would be rendered practically valueless as a tax saving device.9 Con-
sideration of the proper application of the throwback rule is beyond the scope
of this comment for it also raises the issue of whether or not trusts should be
separate taxable entities. Finally, given the present law on the trust as a sepa-
rate tax entity and the application of the throwback rule, one might attack the
problem on the intermediary "multiplication of entities" level. While this com-
ment will be limited to the last approach, complete consideration of the problem
would require examination of the other possibilities.
Specifically, this comment will examine some of the legal rules producing
opportunities for tax minimization through multiple trusts, the past approach
of the Commissioner and the courts to the problem, the present safety of using
multiple trusts, and the type of legislation that would be most effective in com-
bating this type of tax avoidance.
Trusts can be used to minimize taxation if the income from the corpus is
taxed to the trust rather than to the grantor or beneficiaries. 10 In the 1954 Code
the elaborate Clifford sections' provide that the trust's income will not be
attributed to the grantor as substantial owner of the corpus 2 if, in general, the
9 If all distributions were taxed to the beneficiary (subject to credit for taxes paid previ-
ously by the trust), the only major saving accruing from use of the trust entity would be the
interest-free use of the funds representing the difference between the taxes paid by the trust on
accumulations and the taxes that would have been paid by the beneficiary if the income had
been distributed and not accumulated. These funds would be available interest-free from the
year the trust paid taxes on the accumulation until the year in which the accumulation was
distributed. Another saving might arise where the beneficiary's tax bracket was lower in the
later year of distribution than in the earlier year of accumulation. Consult Int. Rev. Code
§668(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §668(a) (1954).
10 The trust may also be used to save taxes even though the beneficiaries are taxed on trust
income. The short-term, non-accumulating trust may be used to-spread income among
family members who are in lower tax brackets than the grantor.
U Int. Rev. Code §§671-78, 26 U.S.C.A. §§671-78 (1954). On these 1954 Code provisions
consult generally, Nance, Taxation of Trust Income to Grantors and Others as Substantial
Owners of the Property, 33 Taxes 899 (1955); Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Estate Planning, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 228-37 (1954); Craven, Taxation of Estate and Trust
Income Under the 1954 Code, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 602-21 (1954); Kamin, Surrey and Warren,
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Col. L. Rev. 1237,
1259-65 (1954). Consult also Holland, Kennedy, Surrey and Warren, A Proposed Revision of
the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft,
53 Col. L. Rev. 316, 358-67 (1953), which discusses the February, 1954 Draft of the American
Law Institute Federal Income Tax Statute. This draft is, with a few exceptions, identical
with the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
1 Where Int. Rev. Code §§671-78, 26 U.S.C.A. §§671-78 (1954) indicate that a grantor
shall be taxable as substantial owner of the property, these statutory sections are controlling.
Conversely, if these sections do not impose tax on the grantor, then the grantor shall not be
held taxable on the trust income under any other provisions of the Code "solely on the grounds
of his dominion and control over the trust." Ibid., §671. However, the grantor may still be
taxable on the trust income as an assignor of an income right. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Rev. Rul. 55-2, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 211 (1955).
If the grantor is taxable as substantial owner of the property as a result of his dominion and
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trust may not be revoked,13 the income may not be used for the benefit of the
grantor,14 the grantor retains no reversionary interest which may vest in pos-
session in less than ten years"5 and the grantor retains no substantial adminis-
trative powers 6 or powers to control beneficial enjoyment."
In situations where the grantor is not taxed, the income beneficiaries, under
current law, are taxed"s only on that portion of the trust income currently dis-
control over the trust, then he is entitled to the deductions and tax credits attributable to the
trust to the extent the Code allows such deducations and credits to individual taxpayers.
Int. Rev. Code §671, 26 U.S.C.A. §671 (1954).
13 Int. Rev. Code §676(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §676(a) (1954) provides that the grantor will be
treated as owner of any portion of a trust if "the power to revest in the grantor title to such
portion is exercisable by the grantor or ['any person (not) having a substantial beneficial inter-
est in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power
which he possesses respecting the trust.' (Ibid., §672[a])] or both." Such a power of revocation
does not, however, render the grantor taxable if it is a power over income that cannot be
exercised within ten years of the transfer in trust. Ibid., §676(b).
14 Int. Rev. Code §677, 26 U.S.C.A. §677 (1954) treats the grantor as owner of the trust if
the income may be distributed to him currently, accumulated for future distribution to him,
or applied to payment of premiums on the grantor's life insurance. The grantor is also taxable
to the extent that any trust income is actually applied or distributed for the support of anyone
whom the grantor is legally obligated to support.
I-Int. Rev. Code §673(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §673(a) (1954) sets forth the general rule rendering
the grantor taxable if any interest in corpus or income "will or may be expected to take effect
in possession or enjoyment within 10 years" from the transfer in trust. The time period is cut to
two years if the income beneficiary is a church, hospital, or educational organization. Ibid.,
§673(b). If the reversionary interest takes effect in possession or enjoyment after death, the
grantor is not taxable even though the income beneficiary has a life expectancy of less than
ten years. Ibid., §673(c).
'6 Int. Rev. Code §675, 26 U.S.C.A. §675 (1954) provides, in general, that the grantor
shall be treated as the substantial owner of the property if he (1) retains a power to deal with
the corpus or income for less than an adequate and full consideration, (2) retains a power to
borrow corpus or income without adequate interest or security, (3) has actually borrowed
corpus or income and has not repaid before the beginning of the taxable year (except where the
unrepaid loan provides for both adequate interest and adequate security and was made by a
trustee other than the grantor or a person subservient to the grantor) or (4) has retained a
power to exercise specified types of voting or investment control over the corpus. Powers
held by a non-adverse party to borrow or deal with the corpus also render the grantor taxable.
17 The grantor is treated as the substantial owner of the property under Int. Rev. Code
§675, 26 U.S.C.A. §675 (1954) if he or a non-adverse party retains a power (exercisable without
approval of an adverse party) of disposition over income or corpus. A large number of powers
are excepted from the general rule, e.g., certain powers to allocate among charitable bene-
ficiaries. Special rules are established for powers exercisable only by "a trustee or trustees, none
of whom is the grantor, and no more than half of whom are related or subordinate parties who
are subservient to the wishes of the grantor," ibid., §674(c); this provision encourages use of
corporate trustees. Still other rules are established for "trustee or trustees, none of whom is
the grantor or spouse living with the grantor."
18 The rule of Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925), that the gift exemption does not apply to
income distributions from testamentary trusts, has been incorporated in Int. Rev. Code
§102, 26 U.S.C.A. §102 (1954). Sections 641-68 control income taxation of trusts and bene-
ficiaries. On income taxation of trusts, consult generally: Casner, The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954: Estate Planning, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 461-77 (1955); Craven, Taxation of
Estate and Trust Income Under the 1954 Code, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 602-21 (1955); Fleming,
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tributed or required to be distributed up to a maximum equal to the distribut-
able net income.19 To assure that current income will be taxed to the trust, it
must be accumulated and distributed when no longer current. The 1954 Code
attempts to discourage such arrangements by a five-year throwback rule0
under which distributions of accumulations from the preceding five years2' are
taxed to the beneficiary, either by including the distribution in the beneficiary's
gross income in the year of distribution or by treating the distribution as hav-
ing been made in the year such income was earned by the trust.2 2 But, the in-
tended effect of the throwback rule may largely be avoided as the rule does not
apply2" to a distribution of income accumulated for a minor,24 to a distribution
to meet the "emergency needs" of a beneficiary,25 to a final distribution made
One Year of Trust Income Taxation Under the 1954 Code, 33 Taxes 892 (1955); Fleming,
Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates Under the 1954 Code, 32 Taxes 931 (1954); Kamin,
Surrey and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries,
54 Col. L. Rev. 1237-59 (1954). Consult also Holland, Kennedy, Surrey and Warren, A Pro-
posed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law
Institute Draft, 53 Col. L. Rev. 316-54 (1953) which discusses the February, 1954 Draft of
American Law Institute Federal Income Tax Project.
19 Distributable net income, a concept introduced in the 1954 Code, is designed to determine
which distributions to a beneficiary are includible in the beneficiary's return as income from
property and which are excluded as corpus distributions. Int. Rev. Code §643(a), 26 U.S.C.A.
§643(a) (1954) defines distributable net income as basically the taxable income of the trust
before the trustee's deduction for distributions and the deduction for personal exemption; a
number of other adjustments to taxable income must be made in certain situations, e.g., tax-
exempt interest. Income currently distributed or required to be currently distributed is in-
cludible in gross income of the beneficiary to the extent of the distributable gross income.
Ibid., §§652(a), 622(a). State law determines whether or notincome is required to be distribut-
ed currently. See Estate of Cohen v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 784 (1947); Case v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.
343 (1947), both applying local law in accordance with similar provisions of the 1939 Code.
20 Int. Rev. Code §§665-68, 26U.S.C.A. §§665-68 (1954). For a discussion of the throwback
rule, consult generally: Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 756-61 (1955 ed.);
Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate Planning, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 465-72
(1955); Foosaner, Five-Year Throwback Rule, 95 Trusts & Estates 688 (1956).
21 Consult Int. Rev. Code §665(b), 26 U.S.C.A. §665(b) (1954) for the definition of "accu-
mulation distribution."
21 Consult note 6 supra.
23 Technically, most of the exceptions operate by excluding certain types of distributions
from the definition of "accumulation distributions." Int. Rev. Code §665(b), 26 U.S.C.A.
§665(b) (1954).
24Int. Rev. Code §665(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. §665(b)(1) (1954) excludes distributions of "in-
come accumulated before the birth of such beneficiary or before such beneficiary attains the
age of 21."
25 Int. Rev. Code §665(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. §665(b)(2) (1954). "Emergency needs" are not
defined in the Code, but Sen. Rep. No. 1,622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (1954) states, "A dis-
tribution based upon an unforeseen or unforeseeable combination of circumstances requiring
immediate help to the beneficiary would qualify. However, the beneficiary must be in actual
need of the distribution. The fact that a beneficiary has other sufficient resources would tend
to negate the conclusion that a distribution was to meet his emergency needs." This exception,
therefore, offers little opportunity for tax planning.
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more than nine years after the last transfer to the trust,)6 to accumulations not
in excess of $2,000,27 or to certain gifts of specific sums or properties paid in not
more than three installments.28 The taxpayer can take advantage of these ex-
ceptions most adequately through use of multiple trusts. For example, the three-
installment, specific-sum exception 9 can be utilized by establishing three trusts,
each distributing in turn every three years beginning in the first year and ter-
minating tax-free three years after its third installment, thereby assuring the
beneficiary a tax-free distribution for each of the twelve consecutive years.
Similarly, if a number of trusts each have income of less than $2,000 a year,
accumulations in one year for distribution in the following year will escape the
throwback rule."
Of the few cases involving multiple trusts, none have dealt with the permis-
sibility of their use to minimize taxation. Rather, the cases have involved only
a construction of the trust instrument to determine how many trusts actually
were created." The expressed intention of the grantor as indicated in the trust
6 Int. Rev. Code §665(b)(4), 26 U.S.C.A. §665(b)(4) (1954).
27 Int. Rev. Code §665(b), 26 U.S.C.A. §665(b) (1954). The accumulation distribution is
carried back to the first preceding year only if it exceeds $2,000, but in determining carryback
to the second through fifth preceding years the size of the remaining accumulation is imma-
terial.
28Int. Rev. Code §663(a)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. §663(a)(1) (1954). This exception operates
by excluding such amounts from the "amounts properly paid or credited or required to be
paid or credited" under §661(a) (2) and thus reducing the "accumulation distribution" under
§665(b).
29 Int. Rev. Code §663(a) (1), 26 U.S.C.A. §663(a)(1) (1954).
30 For examples of other possible uses of multiple trusts consult Surrey and Warren, Federal
Income Taxation 763-64 (1955 ed.).
31 The problem has arisen most often from the use of a single instrument to create several
trusts. The ambiguity has been resolved by an examination of whether the instrument refers
to the singular "trust," see Hale v. Dominion National Bank, 186 F.2d 374 (C.A. 6th, 1951);
Belcher Trust v. Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. 967 (1947); Reid Trust v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 438 (1946);
Hiecke Trust v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 30 (1946); Huntington National Bank v. Comm'r, 90 F.2d
876 (C.A. 6th, 1937), or the plural "trusts," see Lane v. United States, 83 F.Supp. 260 (E.D.
Mo., 1948); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y., 1940). But see
Kohtz Trust v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 554 (1945); Marx v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 537 (1939). In both the
latter cases the instrument used the singular "trust" but the court, holding that multiple trusts
were created, relied heavily on the use of the plural "shares."
It is well settled that multiple trusts can be created although the corpus of each consists of
an undivided interestin a common res. U.S. Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 481 (1936); Helver-
ing v. McIlvaine, 296 U.S. 488 (1936); see Belcher Trust v. Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. 967 (1947);
Kohtz Trust v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 554 (1945); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Kelly, 102 F.2d 986
(C.A.3d, 1939); FidelityUnionTrust Co. v. Kelly, 102 F.2d 333 (C.A.3d, 1939); St.Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 165 (1939); Marx v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 537 (1939); Davis v.
Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 587 (1938); Tiernan v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 1048 (1938); Union Trust Co.
v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 386 (C.A. 3d, 1936). Other factors considered significant by the court in-
clude: if the instrument were construed to create one trust, the rule against perpetuities would
be violated. Grace Trust v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 632 (1949); one clause of the trust instrument,
which allowed the trustee to distribute a maximum of $5,000 out of the invested corpus but
provided that in no event could the original corpus be distributed, led to the conclusion that
the grantor intended a single trust rather than a parent trust with subsidiary trusts receiv-
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instrument was deemed controlling 2 until 1954 when Judge Learned Hand in
McHarg v. Comm'r33 insisted that multiple trusts would be recognized only
where the instrument, under property law, actually created separate and inde-
pendent trusts. 4 The problem in McHarg and previous construction cases prob-
ably could have been avoided through use of a separate instrument for each
trust.
Whether or not a taxpayer can successfully use multiple trusts will depend
in part on the ability of the Commissioner to strike down the separate entities
in the courts. In comparable multiple-entity situations3 such as use of multiple
corporations to secure additional $25,000 surtax exemptions" and $25,000
minimum excess profits tax credits,3 17 there has never been a case decided on
ing the parent's income, Hale v. Dominion National Bank, 186 F.2d 374 (C.A. 6th, 1951); the
treatment by the trustee of the res as the corpus of a single trust was significant because
'lilt is a fair assumption in the usual case that the trustee has been consulted by the trustor in
respect to acceptance of the trust and has some knowledge of his intention." Huntington Na-
tional Bank v. Comm'r, 90 F.2d 876, 878 (C.A. 6th, 1937); discretionary authority given the
trustee to keep the corpus in a consolidated fund indicates the existence of multiple trusts
for, "If a single trust was intended, the discretionary power here given the trustee would be
unnecessary." Fiduciary Trust Co. v. United States, 36 F.Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y., 1940).
3 See, e.g., Hale v. Dominion National Bank, 186 F.2d 374 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Hiecke Trust
v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 30 (1946). Where the intention disclosed in the preamble conflicts with the
intention disclosed in the granting clauses, the latter controls. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Kelly, 102 F.2d 986 (C.A. 3d, 1939); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Kelly, 102 F.2d 333 (C.A.
3d, 1939). The intention disclosed by the trust instrument is more important than the ad-
ministrative treatment of the res by the trustee. See Hiecke Trust v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 30 (1946);
MacManus v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 670 (C.A. 6th, 1942); but see Huntington National Bank
v. Comm'r, 90 F.2d 876 (C.A. 6th, 1937).
" 210 F.2d 792 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
34 Hand distinguished the settlor's intent to create "those limitations that the settlor in
fact does create" from the intent "that those limitations shall be treated as one trust, or as
several." 210 F.2d 792, 794 (C.A. 2d, 1954). The later intent, he argued, was immaterial, for
use as indicia of the number of trusts the "belief or desire of the settlor about what he has
created" would be anomalous as the settlor "may create what he likes, but he may not say
how it shall be taxed." Ibid., at 795.
35 Consult Cohen, Exemptions and Credits of Multiple Corporations: Sections 15(c) and
129 [1953] So. Calif. Tax Inst. 1-3. On multiple corporations, consult generally: Rice, Internal
Revenue Code, Section 269: Does the Left Hand Know What the Right Is Doing, 103 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 579 (1955); Cohen, Exemptions and Credits of Multiple Corporations: Sections 15(c)
and 129, [1953] So. Calif. Tax Inst. 1; Landman, Multiplying Business Corporations and
Acquiring Tax Losses, 8 TaxL. Rev. 81 (1952); Mintz, Attempts to Multiply Taxable Entities:
A New Warning, 4 Am. U. Tax Inst. Lectures 25 (1952).
36 At present the 22% surtax is applicable only to taxable income in excess of $25,000.
Int. Rev. Code §11(c), 26 U.S.C.A. §11(c) (1954).
37 Under the excess profits tax each corporation was given a $25,000 minimum excess profits
tax credit. Int. Rev. Code §430, 26 U.S.C.A. §430 (1939), amended by Revenue Act of 1950,
64 Stat. 1137 (1950). An additional advantage from multiple corporations accrued through
the limitation on the total of income tax plus excess profits tax. Int. Rev. Code §430(a) (2),
26 U.S.C.A. §430(a)(2) (1939), amended by Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1137
(1950).
[Vol. 24
general case-law principles involving the taxpayer's power to minimize taxation
by creation of multiple entities. The Commissioner, faced with this dearth of
directly applicable authority and unwilling to rely on general case-law prece-
dents, secured legislation from Congress before attacking the multiple entities. 8
None of this legislation is in terms, or as construed, applicable to multiple trusts.
In cases not involving multiple entities, however, the courts repeatedly have
held transactions taxable which appeared to be non-taxable. The doctrinal
basis of such decisions has usually been obscured by the court's use of ambiguous
epithets such as "sham"3 9 and "unreal"4 0 to condemn the transaction. Such
"decision by invective"'" offers little aid in analysis of the cases. These tax-
avoidance cases are of two kinds: first, cases where the taxpayer has not done
in fact what he has purported to do and therefore is taxed on what he has ac-
tually done; and second, cases where, although the taxpayer has actually done
what he has purported to do, he is taxed because he has only a tax avoidance,
and not a business, purpose.
The case which most illuminates the first category is Chisholm v. Commission-
er.42 The taxpayer and three others wished to sell appreciated securities but
delay recognition of the gain. The securities, being all the shares of a corpora-
tion, were transferred to a partnership which consummated the sale and used
the proceeds for trading in securities. 43 The Commissioner argued and the
Board of Tax Appeals agreed 4" that the transaction was not bona fide and that
the taxpayer was taxable on the gain.45 The circuit court reversed, holding that
18 Consult discussion at 168-69 infra.
39 E.g. Moline Properties v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436,439 (1943).
40 E.g., Burnet v. Gugenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 284 (1933). It has been stated that "fictions"
should be disregarded, Bradley v. Comm'r, 1 B.T.A. 111, 117 (1924); that courts should "not
be blinded by form or lose sight of the substance," Chisholm v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 1334, 1340
(1934), rev'd 79 F.2d 14 (C.A. 2d, 1935); that "[a] given result at the end of a straight path is
not made a different result because reached by following a devious path," Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); that the courts must not "exalt artifice above reality,"
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935); that "transactions to be effective.., must
have reality," Comm'r v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917, 920 (C.A. 5th, 1946); that "outer form is
not enough for tax purposes," Barrett v. Comn'r, 185 F.2d 150, 151 (C.A. 1st, 1950); and that
"form" must not "obscure the reality," Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941). One
per curiam opinion listed the following epithets-sham, disguise, masquerade, fiction, subter-
fuge, make-believe, mere pretense, mask, screen, veil, artifice and ruse. Kocin v. United States,
187 F.2d 707, 708 (C.A. 2d, 1951.)
41 Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1026
(1953).
- 79 F.2d 14 (C.A. 2d, 1935).
43 The taxpayer was attempting to fit the transaction within the rule of Helvering v. Wal-
bridge, 70 F.2d 683 (1934).
44 George H. Chisholm, 29 B.T.A. 1334 (1934).
41 The Commissioner in Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14 (1935), was relying on Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
1956] COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
a partnership actually had been formed and that it was not "in effect the former
separate businesses of the brothers conducted under a disguise."" Thus, in the
first category of cases,47 "[t]he question always is whether the transaction under
scrutiny is in fact what it appears to be in form."48 That is, the courts are decid-
ing whether or not the taxpayer has done what he has purported to do. Minimi-
zation of taxes through multiple trusts cannot be successfully attacked by the
Commissioner through this factual approach, for it cannot be maintained that
multiple trusts have not in fact been created if the trust instruments are prop-
erly drafted and the formalities of property law observed.
49
In the second category are cases where, although the taxpayer has done what
he has purported to do, he has so acted only for a tax-avoidance, and not a busi-
ness, purpose. In the leading case of Gregory v. Helvering,50 the taxpayer was
sole shareholder of a holding company which held certain low-basis securities
which the taxpayer wished to sell if the cash could flow to her without realiza-
tion of ordinary income through a dividend distribution. The shares of a sub-
sidiary, created to hold the securities for three days, were spun-off to the tax-
payer, and three days later she liquidated the subsidiary and sold the low-basis
securities. The taxpayer contended that the spin-off constituted a tax-free
reorganization, that the liquidation of the subsidiary produced a capital gain,
and that the subsequent sale of the securities produced no gain.51 However, the
46 Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (1935).
47 See Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462 (C.A. 6th, 1953); United States v. Cummins
Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (C.A. 6th, 1948); Howell Turpentine Co. v. Comm'r, 162
F.2d 319 (C.A. 5th, 1947); Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 282 (C.A. 3d, 1944);
Hobby v. Comm'r, 2 T.C. 980 (1943); Comm'r v. Falcon Co., 127 F.2d 277 (C.A. 5th, 1942);
Morsman v. Comm'r, 90 F.2d 18 (C.A. 8th, 1937).
4" Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (1935). Judge Hand continued: "[A] marriage
may be a joke; a contract may be intended only to deceive others; an agreement may have a
collatera] defeasance. In such cases, the transaction as a whole is different from its appearance."
Ibid. One test used was whether or not the transaction was legally binding. Randolph Paul
restated this test, "Are the parties to a transaction bound to unite to undo the transaction, or
is the transaction so firm as to require a new agreement to undo it? It is always inherent
in any transaction that the parties may make a new deal, obliterating the old transaction. The
question is whether a new deal is vital to undoing." Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 129
(1937). This latter test cannot be accepted as a sole test of taxability, for many transactions
purporting to be tax-free have been held taxable although they were legally binding. See, e.g.,
National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591
(1948); Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
41 See McHarg v. Comm'r, 210 F.2d 792 (C.A. 2d, 1954).
50 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
-5 The taxpayer argued that upon the spin-off part of her basis for stock in the parent
should be allocated to the newly-received stock in the subsidiary. Upon liquidation of the sub-
sidiary, the taxpayer would then recognize a gain, taxable at the capital gains rate, equal to the
excess of the fair market value of the securities, the subsidiary's only assets, over the basis
that had been allocated to the subsidiary. As the liquidation was taxable, the taxpayer ob-
tamed a basis for the securities equal to their fair market value and therefore the subsequent
sale resulted in no gain.
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Supreme Court held that the spin-off constituted a dividend of the subsidiary's
shares taxable at ordinary income rates because, although the technical provi-
sions of the Code reorganization section had been scrupulously followed, the
reorganization had no "business or corporate purpose"5" and therefore did not
qualify as a tax-free reorganization under the statute.53
The Gregory principle-that the tax consequences of a transaction which
serves solely a tax-avoidance purpose are to be determined without regard to
the formalities of the transaction-has come to be known as the business pur-
pose doctrine.5 4 Although at first limited to reorganizations," it has been ex-
tended to disallow otherwise available deductions56 and, in the form of a business
activity test, to disregard corporate entities. 7 The Gregory principle has never,
however, been applied as a "trust purpose" s doctrine.
62 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
53 Technically, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), was a statutory construction
case insofar as it decided whether the transaction was a "transfer of assets" within the language
of the statute. Ibid., at 469. See Comm'r v. National Carbide Corp., 167 F.2d 304,306 (C.A. 2d,
1948). A statutory construction analysis could be used to determine whether or not the sepa-
rate entities involved in multiple trusts constitute "trusts" within the meaning of Int. Rev.
Code §§641-68, 26 U.S.C.A. §§641-68 (1954).
54 On the business-purpose doctrine, consult generally: Rice, Judicial Techniques in Com-
bating Tax Avoidance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1041-46 (1953); Michaelson, "Business Pur-
pose" and Tax Free Reorganization, 61 Yale L. J. 14 (1952); Spear, "Corporate Business
Purpose" in Reorganization, 3 Tax. L. Rev. 225 (1947); Lourie, The Business Purpose Doc-
trine, 25 Taxes 800 (1947). The business purpose doctrine appears unalterably contrary to the
now-ancient exhortation that motive in taxation is immaterial. See United States v. Isham,
17 Wall. (U.S.) 496 (1873). Consult Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 104-7 (1937), and
authorities cited therein. Only by investigating the taxpayer's "purpose" was the Court in
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), able to determine whether a tax-free reorganization
existed. Curiously, the Gregory case paid lip service to the motive-is-immaterial shibboleth.
5" See Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938).
56 Kocin v. United States, 187 F.2d 707 (C.A. 2d, 1951).
17 Under the business activity doctrine, the Commissioner may impose taxation as if the
corporation did not exist if the corporation engages in no business activity. See National Car-
bide Corporation v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Hay v. Comm'r, 145 F.2d 1001 (C.A. 4th,
1944); National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (C.A. 2d, 1944); Higgins v. Smith,
308 U.S. 473 (1940). The taxpayer has much more difficulty in persuading courts to disregard
a corporate entity in order to lower taxes. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436
(1943); Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932). But cf. Paymer v.
Comm'r, 150 F.2d 334 (C.A. 2d, 1945). On disregarding the corporate entity, consult generally:
Armstrong, Shall We Have a Clifford Doctrine for Corporations?, 24 Taxes 830 (1946);
Cleary, The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases, 1 Tax L. Rev. 3 (1945); Case, Disregard of Cor-
porate Entity in Federal Taxation, 30 Va. L. Rev. 398 (1944).
The business purpose doctrine has also been extended to: disregard of partnerships, see
Kocin v. United States, 187 F.2d 707 (C.A. 2d, 1951); family partnerships, Goodman v.
Comm'r, 200 F.2d 681 (C.A. 2d, 1953); corporate distributions, Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S.
737 (1947); inter-family gifts, Gouldman v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 686 (C.A. 4th, 1948); corporate
liquidations, Comm'r v. Webster's Estate, 131 F.2d 426 (C.A. 5th, 1942); sale and leaseback
arrangements, Schaffer Terminals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 194 F.2d 539 (C.A. 9th, 1952); and gift
and leasebacks, dissent in White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398,402 (C.A. 2d, 1951).
59 Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 764 (1955 ed.).
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Extension of the Gregory principle to the trust area involves difficulties not
present in business situations, where it admittedly works imperfectly. Use of
the trust, a very flexible property planning device, is encouraged by its advan-
tageous tax features. With tax considerations thus permeating the trust field,
determining whether or not there is a "trust purpose" for splitting a single trust
into several entities presents a more difficult issue than whether or not there is
a "business purpose" in a given business transaction. Nevertheless, a trust pur-
pose doctrine would embody an element of usefulness if the test were whether
or not there was a non-tax reason for the use of several entities rather than one.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that the careful tax planner would be able to
create the appearance of a trust purpose for each of a limited number of trusts.
A trust for each child of the grantor,59 a trust for each business or parcel of real
property,60 or separate trusts to insulate conservative security investments from
liabilities incurred by highly risky businesses to be held in trust would appear
to be reasonably safe from any foreseeable extension of a trust purpose doctrine.
In conclusion, the Commissioner appears to have no precedents or other
means to attack multiple trusts, provided the taxpayer plans each trust to meet
possible development of a trust purpose doctrine6 and observes all formalities
necessary to create separate and independent trusts. The Chisholm line of cases
appears doctrinally inapplicable, the Gregory business-purpose precedents seem
unlikely to reach a well-planned trust program, and the comparable multiple
entity cases in the business area have all relied on special legislation.
Legislation aimed at the multiple trust problem could be of two types:
explicative or directional. The explicative statute attempts to provide set rules
for every factual variation while the directional statute merely provides a statu-
tory standard to be applied by the courts. Typical of the explicative statute are
the Clifford trust provisions, 2 the incorporation and reorganization provisions,63
and the distribution in redemption of stock provisions.64 In the multiple trust
area such a statute would establish specific, objective rules for determining
59 The separate trusts for each child might be justified, for example, by a necessary differ-
ence in investment policies. For a daughter, conservation of principal and stability of income
might properly be the prime considerations. For a talented son, stability of income might prop-
erly be sacrificed in order to achieve appreciation of capital. Further, a trust for a sickly child
might well allow the trustee to invade corpus in emergencies while a trust for a healthy child
might have no such provisions. The possible variations are unlimited, and the Commissioner
may well be unable to determine whether or not the differences are justified by factors which
likely are known only within the family.
60 The taxpayer in demonstrating a trust purpose could point to the custom of office or
apartment building owners of holding each building in a separate corporation.
61 A large number of trusts are unnecessary. In the example in note 3 supra, use of one hun-
dred trusts would save only 34% more in taxes than use of five trusts.
12 Int. Rev. Code §§671-78, 26 U.S.C.A. §§671-78 (1954).
63 Int. Rev. Code §§351-68, 26 U.S.C.A. §§351-68 (1954).
64 Int. Rev. Code §§302, 317(b), 318(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §§302, 317(b), 318(a) (1954).
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whether multiple trusts would be taxed separately or on a consolidated basis;65
the most feasible guiding principle appears to be that income should be con-
solidated where two or more essentially similar trusts are created by the same
grantor for the same beneficiaries.66
An explicative statute would have three major disadvantages. First, the
draftsman would have no experience with the patterns of utilization of mul-
tiple trusts for tax avoidance purposes or with the difficulties of attacking
multiple trusts. The necessity of such experience explains in part why the Clif-
ford trust statutory provisions 7 were not enacted until fourteen years after
Helvering v. Clifford.5 Second, use of the trust, one of the most flexible of all
property devices, might be seriously restricted by arbitrary provisions aimed at
preventing the use of trusts for tax avoidance purposes. Third, closely defined
limits on taxability invite the tax-conscious grantor to focus on achieving the
maximum tax advantages, often at the detriment of sound property planning;
conversely, as the statute would indicate exactly how far the taxpayer might
proceed in establishing multiple trusts,69 its application would most often frus-
trate the poorly advised grantor's plans, assuming the statute applied only to
subsequently created trusts.
Legislation aimed at the multiple trust device probably should be of the
directional type-that is, it should establish a statutory standard.70 A direc-
tional statute would have two primary advantages. First, family property
planning would not be inhibited where the taxpayer could demonstrate that his
use of trusts was motivated by sound non-tax considerations. Second, the tax-
65 Consult discussion at 169 infra.
16 Attribution pro visions would be necessary to prevent reciprocal trust arrangements, but
such a provision would be extremely difficult to draft for trusts are traditionally used for
intra-family purposes and therefore the assumptions underlying sections such as Int. Rev.
Code §318, 26 U.S.C.A. §318 (1954), are inapplicable.
17 Int. Rev. Code §§671-78, 26 U.S.C.A. §§671-78 (1954).
cB 309 U.S. 331 (1940). For an analogy, consult Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 3-165
(1940), for a description of the slow and painful growth of the reorganization provisions, a
process not yet complete.
69 For example, under Int. Rev. Code §302(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. §302(b)(2) (1954), a tax-
payer knows exactly how many shares must be redeemed in order to qualify as a "substantially
disproportionate redemption of stock" and thus receive capital gain treatment. On the other
hand, this same factor of certainty of tax results in business and property planning is the
strength of the explicative statute.
70 Examples of such a standard are "clearly reflect income," Int. Rev. Code §446(b),
26 U.S.C.A. §446(b) (1954), and "essentially equivalent to a ... dividend," Int. Rev. Code
§115(g), 26 U.S.C.A. §llS(g) (1939). Under the 1954 Code the distribution in redemption of
stock provision was changed to an explicative statute, but because the specific provisions
might not cover all possible situations, the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language was
retained to indicate an area beyond that delineated by specific provisions where ordinary
income treatment could be accorded the distribution. Int. Rev. Code §302(b)(1), 26 U.S.C.A.
§302(b)(1) (1954).
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conscious grantor would be restrained from using multiple trusts solely to mini-
mize taxation for he would be unsure how far the courts would go in applying
the statute.
Three directional sections already have been enacted to deal with various
facets of the analogous multiple corporation problem. One, which disallows de-
-ductions, credits, or allowances in certain corporate acquisitions where "the
principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance
of Federal income tax.. .,.n has been singularly unsuccessful in dealing with
split-ups and other multiplications of corporate entities because of its use of the
definite article. "[T1he principal purpose" (italics added) was interpreted to
mean that avoidance of taxation must be more important than any other pur-
pose, and the taxpayers were able to demonstrate an important non-tax purpose
for each entity.
7 2
Consequently, when a second section"8 was enacted to disallow the $25,000
surtax exemption and the $25,000 minimum excess profits tax credit to multiple
corporations, 74 the indefinite article "a" was used in order to avoid the limita-
tions of the prior statute. This section, applicable where avoidance of taxation
is "a major purpose" 5 (italics added), has never been judicially tested.
A third section," giving the Commissioner power to allocate income and
deductions among "two or more organizations, trades or businesses if such
action is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income.. .17 has been held applicable to multiple corporations only if income
71 Int. Rev. Code §269(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §269(a) (1939). This language was first passed in
simpler form in the Revenue Act of 1943, 58 Stat. 47 (1943). The section was primarily designed
to combat "the recently developed practice of corporations with large excess profits (or the
interests controlling such corporations) acquiring corporations with current, past, or prospec-
tive losses or deductions, deficits, or current or unused excess profits credits, for the purpose of
reducing income and excess profits taxes." Sen. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. 58 (1943).
72 For example, in Alcorn Wholesale Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 75 (1951), the court found the
following business reasons for the creation of multiple corporations for conducting a grocery
wholesale business: increased borrowing ability under state banking statutes, limitation of
liability for tort judgments, ability to incorporate in each state to avoid prejudice against
absentee ownership, and ability to obtain franchises for competing lines of merchandise. See
also Chelsea Products, Inc. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 840 (1951), aff'd 197 F.2d 620 (C.A. 3d, 1952);
Berland's Inc. of South Bend v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 182 (1951); Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98
F.Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn., 1951). Consult Treas. Reg. 111, §29.129-3 (1945). But see Alpha
Tank and Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 721 (Ct. Cl., 1953) (semble).
73 Int. Rev. Code §1551, 26 U.S.C.A. §1551 (1954). This section was introduced in slightly
different form by the Revenue Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 468 (1951).
74 Consult notes 36 and 37 supra.
75 Int. Rev. Code §1551, 26 U.S.C.A. §1551 (1954).
76 Int. Rev. Code §482, 26 U.S.C.A. §482 (1954). This provision was introduced in substan-
tially the present form in the 1939 Code. Int. Rev. Code §45, 26 U.S.C.A. §45 (1939).
77 Int. Rev. Code §482, 26 U.S.C.A. §482 (1954).
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is arbitrarily shifted from one corporation to another. 8 It has also been applied
to allow reallocation where business entities have been unnaturally divided.7 9
As trusts holding investment property can, by property accounting procedures,
avoid shifting of income,80 and as the unnatural division of business entities has
no counterpart in the trust field,8' such a statute would appear inadequate to
solve the multiple trust problem.
Of the statutes applied in the analogous multiple corporation area, the "a
principal purpose" directional statute seems preferable. As an expression of con-
gressional intent, it would encourage extension of the Gregory business purpose
doctrine to the trust area. Use of the indefinite article would avoid the difficulty
of requiring the Commissioner to prove that tax avoidance was more important
than all other motives.
Fully as important as the standard to be established is the sanction to be
imposed. Although theoretically many modes of enforcement are possible, it
appears most feasible to give the Commissioner power to tax the separate
trusts together as one trust by consolidation of tax returns or power to tax the
trusts' income to the grantor. As it has been assumed that the general status of
the single trust as a taxpaying entity will remain unchanged, it is presump-
tively legitimate for the grantor to use one trust, and taxing all the trusts as one
would eliminate all tax avoidance stemming from multiplication of trust enti-
ties. A less direct approach 2 would be taxation of the trusts' income to the
79 See Alpha Tank and Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 116 F.Supp. 721 (Ct. Cl.,
1953); Comm'r v. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (C.A. 3d, 1952); Grenada Industries,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd 202 F.2d 873 (C.A. 5th 1953). Under this section the
Commissioner has attributed the income of a number of corporations to a single entity even
though Treas. Reg. 111, §29.45-1(b) (1945) disclaimed any intention of requiring consolida-
tion of tax returns. See Advance Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. Comm'r, 196 F.2d, 1006 (C.A.
2d, 1952). Consult Cooper, Section 45, 4 Tax L. Rev. 131 (1949). Note that Int. Rev. Code
§482, 26 U.S.C.A. §482 (1954), applies to "organizations, trades, or businesses." Arguably
multiple trusts could be included in "organizations."
The Commissioner has also attacked multiple corporations by using the basic gross income
provision, Int. Rev. Code §22(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §22(a) (1939), in conjunction with other pro-
visions of the Code. See Advance Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. Comm'r, supra. The same
approach might be used against multiple trusts.
79 Cf., e.g., Miles-Conley Co. v. Comm'r, 10 T.C. 754 (1948), where the Commissioner
argued that the taxpayer had unnaturally divided his fruit and vegetable commission business
between a corporation and a sole proprietorship; the decision, however, recognized the un-
natural division doctrine.
80 Unless the rule of United States Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 481 (1936), permitting
multiple trusts to hold undivided interests in a single corpus, is changed by statute, the col-
lection of income by one trust for distribution to other trusts holding undivided interests in the
income-producing property should not be sufficient grounds for the Commissioner to invoke
Int. Rev. Code §482, 26 U.S.C.A. §482 (1954). Consult note 31 supra.
S It appears impossible to argue that the grantor has unnaturally divided trust property,
as factors of safety, investment policy, etc. may properly induce unusual combinations of
investments within one trust.
82 The Code does not always attack problems directly. For example, the collapsible corpora-
tion provision, Int. Rev. Code §341, 26 U.S.C.A. §341 (1954), adopts an in terrorem approach.
1956] COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
grantor; this sanction would have a powerful in terrorem effect, but, insofar as
use of a lesser number of trusts would be considered proper, such a drastic
penalty would appear illogical.
This comment has suggested a statute giving the Commissioner power to
consolidate the returns of multiple trusts where tax minimization has been "a
principal purpose" for using a number of trusts rather than a single trust.
However, only one of the possible general approaches to the multiple trust
problem has been examined. The discussion has indicated that it is apparently
impossible to draft an adequate explicative statute and rather difficult to in-
corporate an "avoidance of taxation" or "trust purpose" standard into the
trust area. Experience may demonstrate that there can be no adequate solution
without re-examination of a more fundamental concept-recognition of the
trust as a separate taxpaying entity. Perhaps the final solution lies in restricting
the use of the accumulating trust, possibly by broadening the throwback rule.
COLLISION CLAUSES IN AUTO INSURANCE POLICIES-RECOVERY
FOR DAMAGE BY FALLING OBJECTS OR ACTS OF GOD
The collision clause of the National Standard Automobile Policy reads: "To
pay for direct and accidental loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter
called loss, caused by collision of the automobile with another object. . .. "I
Since collision means "a violent meeting,"'2 the clause would seem to cover any
loss from violent contact with another object,' whether the automobile, the
object or both were in motion. Although in defining collision many courts have
used so broad a definition, 4 insurance companies have argued, usually success-
fully, in favor of excepting collisions caused by falling objects' or acts of God.6
This comment will consider the advisability of such exceptions.
1 Quoted in Barnard v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 81 So. 2d 132, 134 (La. App.,
1955). Consult Faude, Automobile Liability Coverage under the National Standard Auto-
mobile Policy, 27 Miss. L. J. 120 (1956), for a brief historical sketch of the standard policy.
In a standard policy the language of the analogous parts is uniform but there "[are] no rigid
requirements as to sequence or arrangement .... " Ibid., at 121.
2 Webster's Int'l Dictionary 526 (2d ed., 1947).
'In discussing "What Is 'Collision'?" one authority states "that (1) the insured automobile
need not be in motion and (2) the collision need not be with another automobile." Fire, Casualty
and Surety Bulletins, Cpc-2, Auto (Fire) (4th Printing, 1955). Also consult 5 Appleman, Ins.
Law and Practice § 3201 (1941); 13-14 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law § 228 (9th ed.,
1931).
4E.g., Teitelbaum v. St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 296 Ill.App. 327, 329, 15 N.E. 2d
1013, 1013 (1938), where the court said, "'[Collision' means strictly the impact of objects
... through any one of such objects moving against the other. . .
SJacobs v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 135 F.Supp. 837 (W.D. Pa., 1955); O'Leary v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 196 S.W. 575 (Tex.App., 1917). Contra: Barnard v. Houston
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 81 So. 2d 132 (La.App., 1955); Teitelbaum v. St. Louis Fire & Marine
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